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Abstract: A common objection to a pragmatist perspective on scientific expertise is that, while 
there is a well-known pragmatist theory of inquiry, which was formulated first by Peirce, then 
refined by Dewey and others, this theory cannot provide a clear-cut account of scientific expertise. 
In this paper, after addressing this objection in the first section, I claim that, on the contrary, 
pragmatism offers robust tools to think scientific expertise. In Sections 2 to 6, I present five 
important insights that one can derive from a pragmatist epistemology when responding to 
contemporary problems posed by expertise: about science and scientific expertise in a legal context 
(sections 2 and 3), about collective expertise (sections 4 and 5), and even about expertise on 
ignorance (section 6). 
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Introduction 
There is no real treatise on scientific expertise in classical pragmatism.1 There is a 
pragmatist theory of inquiry, which was formulated first by Peirce, then refined by 
Dewey and others, but this theory does not seem to directly provide a clear-cut account 
of expertise.  
A first – and to my mind superficial – explanation for this absence would be that 
this pragmatist account of inquiry is at odds with important features of expertise. One 
can mention at least five reasons for this: (1) expertise answers the need for a reliable 
answer, (2) in the short term, with (3) a reasonable degree of certainty; (4) it is given 
by identified individuals or groups, (5) on the basis of an accepted method. The 
Peircean account of inquiry, as developed in his 1870s papers and refined over the 
decades, is not meant as an account of reliability; it focuses on the long run rather than 
on short spans of time; it presupposes an unlimited community of inquirers rather than 
specific individuals or groups; it does not even spell out a particular method. On (1-
3), Peirce states clearly that science never allows “full belief”, the kind of belief we 
need in action. It would thus be tempting to think that science, in his view, does not 
provide the kind of certainty we need in court, or in other matters, where we must 
choose an immediate line of conduct.2 If science is in “pursuit of eternal verities” over 
1 There are papers on pragmatism and expertise though, see for example (Beck 2015), or, about pragmatism, 
expertise and democracy (Brown 2009). 
2 “In other words, there is no reason to believe in the theory, for belief is the willingness to risk a great deal 
upon a proposition. But this belief is no concern of science, which has nothing at stake on any temporal venture 
but is in pursuit of eternal verities (not semblances to truth) and looks upon this pursuit, not as the work of one 
man's life, but as that of generation after generation, indefinitely.” (Peirce 1960: 5.589). 
Author's version, please refer to the original to  quote from specific pages
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the course of generations, its rhythm seems to be at odds with the timeframe of 
expertise. Inquiry never stops, we can only aim at the “final object” of inquiry, where 
all inquirers, starting from very different points, will eventually converge. On (4), 
Peirce, at least from the 1860s, claimed that the real subject of inquiry – the inquirer 
– is not limited to a particular, historical, community: everyone who is able to 
understand the questions at hand and to contribute in a significant manner is part of 
the inquiry.3 As for (5), assessing scientific expertise seems to presuppose an account 
of what makes this expertise scientific, and Peirce, perhaps the most advanced of the 
pragmatists in mathematical and natural sciences, as well as in philosophy of science, 
always refused to identify science with one single method.4 I shall address this 
objection in the first section, and show why the opposition mentioned at the beginning 
is superficial. However, I think that focusing on this point would lead us to overlook 
a more important fact: pragmatism offers robust tools to think scientific expertise. 
Accordingly, in Sections 2 to 6, I shall present five important insights that can be 
derived from pragmatist epistemology when responding to contemporary problems 
posed by expertise. 
To present these insights, I shall build on four major pragmatist claims:5 their 
common anti-skepticism, their approach to the elucidation of abstract meanings, their 
attention to the “publics” and to the social nature of mind in general, and finally their 
understanding of knowledge as a capacity that can be fostered or impaired. Despite 
the movement’s remarkable inner diversity, the pragmatist nature of these claims is 
not controversial. Pragmatists all share a staunch anti-skepticism: Peirce derided 
Cartesian “paper doubts”, James tried to find cures to speculative melancholy and 
skepticism in his Will to Believe, Dewey wrote The Quest for Certainty to show that 
the quest for – absolute, theoretical – certainty was an ill-advised strategy to counter 
practical uncertainty. Skepticism, in their analyses, was in most cases the result of a 
misguided way of understanding science. They felt that one would certainly end up 
facing skepticism if one adopted epistemic goals that were too unrealistic, or an 
unreliable method, or if there were too many obstacles in one’s way after adopting a 
given method to achieve a given goal.6 Their fallibilist account of science was 
precisely an answer to this risk, as was the fact that they focused on the practice of 
science, as opposed to its idealizations. Secondly, they all have their own distinctive 
version of Peirce’s maxim, urging us to pay attention to “practical bearings” in order 
to elucidate abstract terms. Thirdly, the social nature of mind can take several forms 
in the movement, from an emphasis on the semiotic community in Peirce to a full-
blown theory of the publics in Dewey. Finally, Peirce, James and Dewey all thought 
that our beliefs were organically connected to our conduct, which led them to view 
knowledge as a capacity rather than as a mere state.  
The intuition developed in Sections 2 and 3 is that skeptical risks can occur not 
only in our individual epistemic lives, but can also be caused by the definitions of 
science adopted by institutions, in particular when they regulate scientific expertise, 
and that a pragmatist account of abstract terms is better fitted to detect those risks and 
to offer countermeasures. Section 2 deals with general definitions of science in 
legislation, Section 3 with the criteria mentioned in the Daubert Framework regulating 
 
3 “Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion 
of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge” (Peirce 1960: 
5.311). 
4 “That which constitutes science, then, is not so much correct conclusions, as it is a correct method. But the 
method of science is itself a scientific result. It did not spring out of the brain of a beginner: it was a historic 
attainment and a scientific achievement. So that not even this method ought to be regarded as essential to the 
beginnings of science. That which is essential, however, is the scientific spirit, which is determined not to rest 
satisfied with existing opinions, but to press on to the real truth of nature. To science once enthroned in this 
sense, among any people, science in every other sense is heir apparent” (Peirce 1960: 6.428). 
5 These claims are discussed in more detail in (Girel 2017a). 
6 In his rereading of Descartes’s first Meditation, (Williams 2010) offers a nice reduction of “standard 
skepticism” along these three elements (goals, method, obstacles).  
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scientific expertise in the US, both at the federal level and in some states. In Sections 
4 and 5, I address collective expertise: a “pragmatist” model of expertise can be a 
model where the public, in interaction with scientists and politicians, plays a 
prominent role (Section 4); it can also be a pragmatist way of looking at collective 
expertise in general, describing them in terms of collective actions and practical 
outputs (Section 5). Finally, there are situations where experts must testify not only 
about states of knowledge, but also about states of ignorance and, once again, 
apprehending knowledge as a capacity and beliefs as dispositions to act allows us to 
understand why this is possible (Section 6). The whole article can be read as a 
roadmap for the exploration of scientific expertise from a pragmatist standpoint. 
1. Inquiry and Scientific Expertise 
It would be misleading to think that one does not find precious resources to 
conceptualize expertise in Peirce. First of all, inquirers can provide reliable reports on 
the current state of knowledge: they do not need to wait for the “final opinion” to tell 
what science is capable of today. Thus, while it would be foolish to state right now 
what will be the eventual scientific verdict on dark matter, physicists can report 
reliably on present scientific achievements on the topic. When serving as experts, they 
can assess calls for projects on that topic, for example. Secondly, the crude opposition 
between the scientist à la Peirce and our naive view of the expert certainly tells more 
about our preconceptions of expertise than about expertise itself. Talisse made exactly 
this point when criticizing an abstract view of expertise as “elite” knowledge, far 
removed from the activity of research. The primary condition, in order to be an expert 
about extant knowledge, is to actually take part in a line of inquiry. Being an expert 
implies participating in research, and this participation is not understood by Peirce as 
“monolithic”: 
… in the Peircean view, experts are not elites. That is, according to the Peircean, the status of 
being an expert is contingent on an ongoing engagement with inquiry; one is an expert insofar as 
one is continually engaged in the process of justification. Hence expertise is not a matter of standing 
above the processes of inquiry and simply issuing decrees and orders; no expert qua expert is entitled 
to deference. Rather, the expert is someone who must continually meet the challenges of issuing 
reasons, giving arguments, and meeting objections. That is, expertise is ultimately inseparable from 
inquiry, and, as we have seen, inquiry is an inherently inclusive process of exchanging reasons, 
arguments, and evidence. Yet these norms of inclusion do not require merely the removal of barriers 
to participation; they prescribe epistemic practice that actively seeks out and engages unfamiliar and 
unorthodox voices. concerns, and arguments. Were inquiry not constituted in part by norms of this 
active kind of epistemic inclusion, it could not perform its function of arriving at the best beliefs 
(Talisse 2013: 92). 
Peirce actually served as a scientific expert early in his career, and this historical 
example seems to confirm that expertise, in his eyes, was then in no way disconnected 
from inquiry and the production of new knowledge.7 This example shows that, to him, 
providing expertise was not only a matter of stating an opinion, but also involved 
proposing a model and advancing science in a particular context. In 1867, a lawsuit 
caught the attention of all New Englanders: a wealthy heiress, Hetty Robinson, sued 
the executors of her aunt's will, producing a document allegedly bearing her aunt’s 
signature. Since this document revoked the official will and granted Hetty Robinson 
almost all of the fortune bequeathed, in lieu of a much less advantageous distribution 
for the heiress, the whole question was to determine the validity of the new document, 
and in particular the authenticity of the signature. This trial, which has been 
 
7 “Deposition of Charles S.  Peirce, Wednesday, June 5, 1867” (Supreme Court 1868: 761–765). 
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remarkably documented,8 opposed two approaches to evidence in the legal field, 
between classical empiricism and a new thinking imbued with the probabilistic spirit.  
Each side had summoned academic witnesses. The defense had hired Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Sr and Louis Agassiz, two of the most respected scientists of the 
time. The former claimed not to see any “notable difference” between the inks of the 
two documents; the latter claimed to have checked the similarity of the two signatures 
under a microscope, and not to have observed any trace of lead, which could have 
indicated a pencil decal. These two strategies could be seen as belonging to classical 
empiricism: one is looking for a particular “impression”, a single observation that will 
settle the case. 
The prosecution had enlisted the services of Benjamin Peirce, then Professor of 
Mathematics at Harvard and Superintendent of the Coast Survey, assisted by his son 
Charles Peirce. Their own approach consisted in identifying the various downstrokes 
in the signature line, and they were able to observe from the outset that the thirty 
points they had singled out coincided exactly in two signatures: the will and another 
document. They then calculated the probability of this event occurring in general. 
They obtained forty-two signatures from the legatee and established, based on more 
than 25,000 comparisons, that there were only 5,000 cases of coincidence (i.e. cases 
in which one point corresponded to a similar point in another of the signatures). There 
was therefore one chance in five that a given point would be similar in two different 
signatures. This then enabled them – albeit based on the non-trivial, and objectionable, 
assumption that they were dealing with independent events – to state that the 
probability of producing two signatures with exactly these thirty points superposed 
was almost nil (corresponding to (1/5)30).9 The public saw this as academic 
speculation, but it is one of the first scientific uses of probability in a lawsuit.10  
Historians have raised criticisms about the calculation proposed by the Peirces 
(Meier and Zabell 1980), but the fact that their line of reasoning was sound has 
remained undisputed. If that is so, we can draw the following conclusions: this 
expertise involves an actual inquiry and fits all five criteria mentioned above: it 
provides a reliable answer (1), in the short run (2), with the best level of certainty 
available (3), by two experts, themselves members of specific epistemic communities 
(4), and relying on a statistical method, applied for the first time in court (5). Through 
this expertise, we have learnt something, for which they provide a model: that it is 
highly improbable to find two signatures that are exactly similar. Their model is 
connected to the last developments of science: the younger Peirce made a daily use of 
statistics in his work as a “pendulum swinger”, and would shortly after apply the same 
resources to astronomical observations, the economy of research and the study of 
reaction time. Hacking sees here one of the first uses of statistics in court. This 
expertise also leads to reconsider the actual presuppositions of empiricism. The 
observable here is nothing without the mathematical apparatus required to evaluate it. 
What is supposed to determine the opinion of jurors is not an isolated fact (as Holmes 
and Agassiz seemed to believe) but a relationship between facts, in this case a 
relationship between favorable and unfavorable cases. Such proof was miles away 
from classical empiricism, as it involved a “relationalist” and probabilistic 
empiricism. The “conceivable practical effects” were not, even before Charles Peirce 
 
8 The main report is given by Fisch, (Peirce 1982, 2: xxiii–xxiv) [hereafter W, followed by volume and 
page]; more context is provided by (Menand 2001a) and (Menand 2001b: 163 ff.). 
9 “So vast an improbability is practically an impossibility. Such an evanescent shadow of probability 
cannot belong to actual life. They are unimaginably less than those least things which the law cares for” B. 
Peirce, quoted in (Menand 2001b: 173). 
10 In the quoted article, Menand rightly points out that DNA identifications are also based on probability 
(and that, in the case of the O.J. Simpson trial, the DNA evidence was of less weight than the famous glove) 
(Menand 2001a: 70). 
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had written the first word of his pragmatism series, as rudimentary as a trace of pencil 
lead or the print of a pen tip.11 
Let us assume at this point that a pragmatist theory of inquiry, such as the one 
developed by Peirce and his followers, not only accommodates a robust conception 
of expertise, but that history also shows that the practice of expertise coincides exactly 
with the first stages of Peirce’s thought. Can we go a step further to show that a 
pragmatist view of expertise would not only, as a set of tools, better explain scientific 
expertise in court but also, as a substantive theory, be preferable to some other 
alternatives? 
2. Science in Court: Demarcation, Skepticism and Ambiguity 
Before turning to Daubert in the next section, let us see how institutions can 
actually endorse epistemological claims. Disputes about what science is have been 
frequent in court, one of the most famous examples certainly being the Epperson vs 
Arkansas trial12 over the equal treatment of “Creation Science” in the classroom. As 
is well known, Judge Overton turned on that occasion to philosopher Michael Ruse 
for a series of demarcation criteria. The idea was to show that Creation Science did 
not meet these criteria, hence that it was no science at all but was in fact religion in 
disguise, so much so that it violated the Establishment clause13 and should therefore 
not be allowed in public classrooms. There were five criteria: 
[Science] is guided by natural law; it has to be explanatory by reference to natural law; it is 
testable against the empirical world; its conclusions are tentative, i.e. are not necessarily the final 
word; and it is falsifiable (McLean v. Arkansas, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D Ark. 1982)). 
The first three criteria can notoriously be found in Hempel (in his deductive-
nomological account of law and his logic of confirmation), the last two in Popper 
(fallibility, refutability), which is already a strange mix, since these epistemologies 
are at odds on many important points, starting with the role of confirmation and 
induction. I wished to mention this historical background before turning to Daubert, 
because it definitely presupposes a specific line of argumentation: Consider a corpus 
C; Consider x criteria covering any scientific explanation (and nothing else); Does C 
fit all x criteria? If not, C is no science.  
In view of our mention of skepticism and pragmatism, such an approach is 
immediately open to skeptical challenges. The first danger is to uphold too dogmatic 
a view of science: the argument needs a substantive characterization of science in 
general, and the ensuing debate between Ruse and Laudan showed that the definition 
encapsulated in Overton's criteria certainly was controversial (Laudan 1982; Ruse 
2009). As Laudan also remarked, even with goals such as keeping creationism out of 
the classroom in mind, it is certainly better to show that a set of claims, in this case 
creationist geology, has been refuted, or “debunked”, than to immunize it by saying it 
is irrefutable. The danger, this time, is to spark off a second controversy over the 
importance and value of demarcation arguments and thus about the demarcation 
strategy itself.  
Moreover, putting such a definition of science in a legal opinion sets a dangerous 
precedent: if one wants to change the science curriculum for religious or ideological 
purposes, a likely move will then be to try and change the very definition of science 
in the standards in order to circumvent the criteria, thus introducing skeptical 
challenges over science itself in the legislative process. This is exactly what happened 
 
11 This was by no means Peirce’s only experience in expertise, see for example (W8: lxxxvi). 
12 See (Forrest and Gross 2004). 
13 Part of the First Amendment, stipulating that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Introducing a particular religious doctrine in the curriculum 
would amount to “establishing” it against other creeds or denominations. 
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with the Intelligent Design movement14 in many states. Here is an example from 
Missouri in 2013, with a failed legislative attempt at redefining science: 
“Scientific theory”: an inferred explanation of incompletely understood phenomena about the 
physical universe based on limited knowledge, whose components are data, logic, and faith-based 
philosophy. The inferred explanation may be proven, mostly proven, partially proven, unproven or 
false and may be based on data which is supportive, inconsistent, conflicting, incomplete, or 
inaccurate. The inferred explanation may be described as a scientific theoretical model Missouri 
HB291 (2013).15 
Surely no one would like to teach an Epistemology course on the basis of such a 
poor and misleading definition of science. One cannot grasp what these statements 
are doing by mere semantical or syntactical analysis: a minimal pragmatist reading of 
them – taking into consideration what these definitions will do – is necessary if we 
want to understand their practical import. If such a definition was accepted, it would 
immediately release the pressure on the teaching of ID in the classroom. It makes 
sense indeed: the demarcation criteria were not used in order to tell science from 
pseudoscience in general in the first place, they were a litmus test for compliance with 
the Establishment clause; the challenge does not try to give a better description of 
science, it seeks to elude the grip of Overton’s criteria. To account for what exactly is 
happening here, the Popperian or Hempelian “surface” of the criteria will not suffice: 
one needs a richer pragmatist perspective. A merely formal approach to science will 
be blind to such a problem; a pragmatist approach, considering the “practical 
bearings” of the adoption of a definition, will be better suited.  
Even if the direct skeptical risks are avoided, another danger is that even bad 
science will qualify, provided it even remotely fits the criteria: a climate change 
denialist paper, for example, “playing” the effect of the sun against that of greenhouse 
gases, would certainly qualify. The criteria are not precise enough: they do not say 
anything about which science is worth teaching. They seem to provide a useful 
demarcation between science and pseudoscience, while what would be needed, if they 
were to be generalized for the screening of curricula, is a characterization of good and 
teachable science. Science is not only a descriptive term, it is also a normative one, 
and it is possibly the latter sense which is implied here.  
Being mindful of such differences in reference is crucial for pragmatists. Peirce, 
in How to Make our Ideas Clear (1878), wrote his famous maxim about reaching the 
third grade of clearness, in addition to being familiar with a notion and having a 
definition for it. The “pragmatist maxim” introducing this “third grade” is the 
following: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects 
is the whole of our conception of the object” (W3: 266). For example, in the context 
of mechanics, the notion of “force” does not refer to a shadowy entity but to the way 
we compound partial accelerations. “Hard” for a mineralogist means that his knife 
will not be able to scratch this rock. A term can be ambiguous, which is often the case 
in our conversations, and we generally disambiguate it by describing the context (“the 
practical bearings”) we have in mind. Still, we must not have too narrow an idea of 
these practical bearings: they need not refer to particular sensations, or immediate 
gratifications, but should also cover more complex situations, such as making a 
 
14 For example, in the 2005 Dover trial, most of Steve Fuller’s expert report in favor of ID attacked the idea 
of demarcation as outdated. See in particular: “ID is a legitimate scientific inquiry that does not constitute 
'religion' in a sense that undermines the pursuit of science more generally or, for that matter, undermines the 
separation of State and Church in the US Constitution.”(Rebuttal of Dover Expert Reports, Kitzmiller, et al., vs 
Dover School District, et al, 2005: 1) 
15 If the discussion moves to another level and addresses the context of the classroom, the next gambit will 
be to offer uncontroversial pedagogical norms to introduce Intelligent Design or germane topics; such has been 
the function of the “Teach the Controversy” campaign: appealing to the pedagogical interest of scientific 
controversies to introduce a fabricated controversy between standard biology and ID. See (Campbell 2003) for 
an example and (Branch, Scott, and Rosenau 2010) for an analysis. 
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judgment, solving a problem, building evidence… To give a pragmatist clarification 
is to make that background explicit by referring to what we aim to do, to our purposes, 
and that is exactly what was missing in the above example. In his comments on 
Whewell, Peirce understood scientific controversies this way. They always 
presuppose something beyond the terms of the controversy, which gives the latter all 
its weight and importance: 
A clear conception resulting from a discussion is often formulated in a definition, but […] in 
that case some proposition expressed or implied has always gone along with the definition. Thus 
along with the definition of the uniform force goes the proposition that gravity is a uniform force 
and along with the definition of the Vis Viva, and in the whole discussion concerning it, it is assumed 
that in the mutual action of bodies the whole effect of the force is unchanged (W2: 342). 
We miss the gist of controversies if we just focus on definitions and fail to have 
the larger picture in mind. In the same way here, we need pragmatism both for 
assessing the skeptical risks introduced by criteria and to account for what criteria 
should do and what they actually do. 
3. Daubert and the “Federal philosophy of science” 
Definitions of science can also be found in texts regulating the admissibility of 
scientific expertise in court.16 Such is the case of the Daubert framework, used in 
federal courts and in some states of the United States. I shall not embark here into a 
discussion of all its philosophical aspects, since it is one of the most discussed legal 
texts. Instead, I shall confine myself to the un-pragmatic view of science present in 
what is called the Daubert “trilogy”17 –Daubert vs Merrell Dow  (1993), General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael  (1999) –, examining 
it from the perspective and with the tools provided in the previous section. 
What prompted this series of legal texts trying to redefine scientific expertise was 
initially the 1975 new Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), which were too lax according 
to some observers (Huber 1991).18 In one famous case, a psychic was even able to sue 
a clinic, claiming that she had lost her psychic powers after a scan, and she found an 
expert to assist her. In the context of Daubert vs Merrell Dow, a more classical case 
over a morning-sickness medication called Bendectin, the US Supreme Court had to 
rule, after a series of appeals, about the admissibility of an expertise which consisted 
in in vitro, in vivo analyses, pharmacological studies and a reanalysis of publications. 
The judges then issued a set of criteria, with additions in 1997 and 1999, which were 
incorporated into the FRE702: 
Many considerations will bear on the inquiry, including (1) whether the theory or technique in 
question can be (and has been) tested, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and 
publication, (3) its known or potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling its operation, and (4) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant 
scientific community (Daubert Standard, 509 U. S. 579, 1993). 
As mentioned, this set was supplemented by others over time: General Electric Co. 
v. Joiner stated that the initial judgment could be reversed only in the case of an “abuse 
of discretion” by the trial judge, and the framework was also extended to non-
scientific, e.g. technical, expertise in Kumho. The criteria seem reasonable: the first 
one can fit either Hempel or Popper, depending on our understanding of “tested”. 
Although it can be a problem if the case involves a medication that has been 
 
16 It is not always the case; for another system, see (Leclerc 2005). On Daubert, see (Kaye 2004). On the 
implicit epistemology of these texts, see (Haack 2005; 2010; 2016). 
17 Legal scholars have explored both the incorporation of Daubert in the Federal Rules and recalcitrance to 
those rules, see (Bernstein and Lasker 2015). 
18 Peter Huber’s standpoint is not neutral as he was, with the Manhattan Institute, a fierce critic of the legal 
framework regulating torts litigation (Huber 1990). 
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discontinued, or in situations where a test is not possible anymore, it involves a basic 
assumption and is not controversial per se. The second one is closer to the sociology 
of science: it is also reasonable, but a rare disease or the rare side-effects of a 
medication are not always documented in peer-reviewed journals. The third one is 
technical. The fourth is another version of a former criterion called the “Frye test”. It 
was elaborated in the context of a 1923 trial where the expert, William M. Marston, a 
noted psychologist, proposed the use of a polygraph as a lie detector in favor of the 
defendant, James Frye. The expertise was dismissed because the judges felt that such 
a technique had not gained “general acceptance” in the relevant community: 
While the courts will go a long way in admitting experimental testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs 
(FRYE vs. UNITED STATES. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir 1923). 54 App. D. C., at 47, 293 F., at 1014). 
Using such a test implies deciding which principles are “generally accepted” in a 
community. The problem is thus to know whether a judge, as opposed to an STS 
scholar or a scientist from the field, is in a good position to make such a judgment. In 
this instance, if the relevant community was that of experimental psychologists in 
1923, it might be claimed that the use of the polygraph was in fact “generally 
accepted” (McCormick 1927, Alder 2007).  
Other criteria were added in the course of time. The Court also made clear, in what 
is often called Daubert II, that the expertise should have no “inherent bias” and that, 
if developed in view of litigation, it should be treated with caution:  
One significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters 
growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or 
whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying (Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
I have three series of remarks here: 
1) On the main presupposition. As shown by Haack in her series of papers, the 
Supreme Court tried to derive reliability from validity. What was needed was a 
reliable expert; the Supreme Court ruled that this reliability depends on whether a 
valid scientific method has been used. To qualify as a scientific expert, the expert has 
to convince the judge, in pretrial, that his/her testimony is founded upon science, upon 
“the” scientific method.  
In order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be derived by the 
scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., “good 
grounds,” based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to 
“scientific knowledge” establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability (509 U. S. 579, 1993, italics 
mine). 
Trying to derive reliability from validity and mentioning Popper's authority is 
already a mistake in itself.19 Moreover, the Supreme Court's implicit major premise, 
which we might call its “Master Argument”, can be summed up this way: “there is a 
uniquely rational mode of inference or procedure of inquiry used by all scientists and 
only by scientists.” Referring to “the” scientific method or to any equivalent is 
referring to a ghost: there is no such thing in general, and for a pragmatist it will 
immediately give rise to skeptical challenges. In addition, placing the judge in the 
situation of a gatekeeper turns him or her into a “super-epistemologist” (or “amateur 
scientist”), and no criteria are given to assess this kind of expertise. Peircean 
pragmatists, who frame inquiry as a communal endeavor, will also remark that, while 
the second and fourth criteria stress the social nature of science, the decision made by 
the judge will be a solitary one. 
 
19 “Corroboration (or degree of corroboration) is [...] an evaluating report of past performance. [I]t says 
nothing whatever about future performance, or about the ‘reliability’ of a theory.” (Popper 1972: 18).  
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2) On “Skeptical pressures”. If we have the initial picture of standard skepticism 
in mind, with over-optimistic goals, unreliable methods and epistemic obstacles, this 
set of criteria can be read as raising hurdles, and thus multiplying obstacles. This can 
be a good thing if it removes manifestly unscientific expertise from the courtroom. 
But if the criteria are interpreted as cumulative, the risk is that some science will not 
be able to make it into the courtroom: someone suffering from a rare disease might 
not have peer-reviewed research to back him up, so that the expertise might not fit the 
second criterion. Fingerprint identification had been used in court for over a century 
but its methods and results had not been published in peer-reviewed journals, 
fingerprints experts had to face Daubert challenges (Cole 2009). If research made in 
preparation for litigation is dismissed, some plaintiffs will have no case, since they 
need such research to substantiate their claims about undocumented effects, while 
corporate research made years in advance might not suffer from such a problem.   
It is possible, but I shall leave this question to historians, that the Post-Daubert era 
has been “tougher than before on expert testimony proffered by plaintiffs in civil 
cases” (Haack 2005: S70). David Michaels went even further, claiming that these 
hurdles prevented plaintiffs from having their day in court:  
While Daubert may have chased out some lawsuits based on questionable science, it serves to 
erect hurdles for scientific testimony and do not reflect the way science works, hurdles that may 
unduly protect wealthy and powerful defendants (Michaels 2008: 175).  
He feared, or predicted, that the same evolution would occur at the level of 
regulatory agencies, pressed to adopt Daubert-like criteria:  
Likewise, the legal, economic, and political obstacles that regulators already face will seem 
trivial compared to what they will face if Daubert-like criteria are applied to each piece of scientific 
evidence used to support a regulation (Michaels 2008: 174).20 
3) Pragmatic concerns. The problems mentioned in (1) and (2) can ground an 
argument in favor of a pragmatic approach to demarcation problems, of the kind 
defended by Resnik: demarcation criteria do not work in the abstract, they presuppose 
values, and they all have practical effects, which should be made explicit at the outset. 
Resnik argued in favor of including a multiplicity of interests when defining science 
for expertise, depending on the context: “[p]ractical interests and concerns should play 
an important role in answering the question ‘what is science?’ because they form an 
important part of the pragmatic features of this kind of question” (Resnik 2000: 262). 
Resnik further claimed that, without subscribing to a relativistic view of science, some 
criteria were more relevant in some contexts, such as education, law, medicine or 
engineering, and that, depending on the ends one was pursuing, a more conservative 
or a more liberal approach could be endorsed:  
Some emphasize testability or verifiability, others emphasize empirical support or reliability, 
and still others emphasize rational consensus, progress, problem-solving ability, explanatory power, 
and so on (Resnik 2000, 262). 
These criteria all describe something that is an integral part of scientific research. 
Such a perspective would alleviate the skeptical risk induced by the “Master 
Argument” over science, while also helping to critically examine the kind of hurdles 
introduced by that series of criteria; finally, and more substantially, it would provide 
a more flexible framework. Caudill and LaRue, in what they consider to be a 
pragmatist contribution to the debate, have proposed corrections to the criteria, more 
likely in their view to be adopted by federal judges than Resnik’s proposal: “(1) 
Medical Diagnosis Often Relies on Patient Reports, Not Objective Measurement 
Techniques, (2) Science Involves Uncertainty, Teamwork, and Alternative 
Explanatory Models, (3) Science Is Probabilistic, Not Certain, (4) Not All Scientific 
 
20 On this, see (McGarity and Wagner 2008). 
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Knowledge Is Peer Reviewed and Published, (5) The Limitations of Social Science 
Do Not Make It Unscientific” (Caudill and LaRue 2003: 24-29). I fail to see any 
reason why these more flexible criteria would necessarily be more lenient, and they 
would surely fit the actual practice of science much better.  
4. Pragmatism and Policy Expertise 
With the case of Daubert, we have focused on scientific expertise provided by 
individual experts. Of course, the evaluation of the expert by the judge can take a 
dialogic form, but it addresses a single testimony, and the dialogue takes place before 
the expert testimony. However, this is only one of the possibilities for scientific 
expertise: there are more collective forms, which could also benefit from pragmatist 
insights and are better described in pragmatist terms, that is to say, in terms of what 
they aim to do, in terms of what they achieve, in terms of how they transform a 
situation.  
Here, two approaches are possible. One can provide a typology of expertise where 
one variant will be considered “pragmatic”, or more pragmatic, than the others: such 
will be the subject-matter of the present section. Another approach is to provide a 
pragmatic account of expertise, in particular collective expertise, including models 
that are not termed “pragmatic” or “pragmatist” by their advocates. I shall address this 
point in the next section. The two projects may certainly overlap but they have 
different goals: the first one regulates competing models of expertise, one of them 
being termed “pragmatic” or “pragmatist” for reasons that will be explained; the latter 
provides a pragmatic account of what collective expertise does.  
I shall borrow a typology fitting the first scenario from Martin Kowarsch, as 
developed in Part II, Chapter 4 of Kowarsch (2016).21 I shall focus here on Kowarsch's 
refinement of Habermas's typology, which is particularly helpful for our discussion. 
Kowarsch addresses the normative underpinnings of four classical models of 
scientific expertise that are prevalent in policy: a “decisionist” model, a “technocratic” 
model, a “legitimisation” model and a “pragmatic” one. In the first one, the 
Decisionist model, the ends, which cannot be established by experts (because of an 
alleged fact/value dichotomy and because they involve values22), are determined 
through political negotiations, and scientists provide expertise about the means 
required to achieve those ends. In this pattern, there are three distinct roles: the public 
can provide a formulation of the problem or raise claims, policymakers determine 
both the policy goals and the implementation of policies, and expert-scientists cast 
light on the appropriate means. 
The Technocratic model, much discussed these last few years under the name of 
epistocracy, has a different structure: “[t]he proponents of the technocratic model 
argue that due to the increasing and huge complexity as well as the novelty of current 
policy problems, they can no longer be solved by politicians” (Kowarsch 2016: 88). 
If in the first model the public was able, in theory at least, to exert some pressure on 
policymakers regarding the formulation of the problem, and more generally the 
political agenda, its role is much more limited here: scientists, perhaps in collaboration 
with the public in the more liberal versions, are required to identify and formulate the 
relevant problems; to identify the relevant goals; and to prescribe the means, while 
policymakers, at the end of the process, simply implement the recommended policies. 
As Kowarsch remarks: “[t]he technocratic model suggests that scientific consensus 
 
21 Let me say clearly that I'm also well aware of the distinctly pragmatist contribution offered by Kowarsch 
in this monograph, in particular in his treatment of the fact/value entanglement, and that anyone interested in 
policymaking should read this book. As the author announces, the book provides “a philosophical framework 
for an appropriate contribution of the indispensable social-science expertise, particularly economics, to the public 
evaluation of and reasoning about climate policy options” (Kowarsch 2016: vi), a much-needed task indeed. 
22 See Gronda in this volume for a perspective on this alleged dichotomy. 
 - 11 - 
can and should be created only through pure science itself, and denies the role of 
society, culture or politics in scientific knowledge production” (Kowarsch 2016: 90). 
Any strong mobilization from the public can only be counterproductive, and certainly 
irrational in some ways.  
The first two models presuppose a strong separation between science and policy-
making: they are variations of the “linear model”, where policies somehow derive 
linearly from sound science, whether this scientific authority is omnipresent, as in the 
second model, or whether it is confined to the study of the means. The linear model 
also presupposes a grim picture of the public's ability to understand current challenges 
and to have an informed and valuable opinion about it. Both models involve 
substantial claims about the rationality of values and the possibility of rational public 
debates. 
The “Legitimisation model” makes an instrumental use of scientific authority to 
legitimize policies: “[p]olicy options are legitimated by referencing scientific 
expertise, although – in contrast to the technocratic model – at least some of the 
players involved are well aware of the fact that the particular policy cannot be 
determined by the sciences in a largely ‘value-free and objective’ manner” (Kowarsch 
2016: 94). This model looks like the decisionist model, but in surface only: the 
“science” (or “sound science”) is carefully cherry-picked to fit the political ends. The 
epistemic authority here is just a mask for the sheer exercise of power.23  
The “Pragmatic model”  (“Pragmatistic”, in Habermas) rejects both the 
technocratic idea that scientists, and only scientists, can settle means and ends, and 
the decisionist idea that the identification of means should be left to scientists only: 
“advocates of the pragmatic model usually state that the sciences cannot offer, roughly 
spoken, ‘absolutely true’ knowledge and that scientific knowledge is always highly 
value-laden” (Kowarsch 2016: 91). It involves, for the ends as well as for the means, 
“a critical interaction between the sciences, policy and the public” (Kowarsch 2016: 
92). Seeing how this model is more pragmatic than the others might seem difficult at 
first sight, but the criticism of the fact-value dichotomy plays a core role here. This 
was already the case in Habermas's account, who insisted on the interaction between 
the expert and the politician: “[i]n the pragmatistic model the strict separation between 
the function of the expert and the politician is replaced by a critical interaction. This 
interaction not only strips the ideologically supported exercise of power of an 
unreliable basis of legitimation but makes it accessible as a whole to scientifically 
informed discussion, thereby substantially changing it” (Habermas 1971: 80). This 
last model is the most democratic one, since “social interests, as reflected in the value 
systems, are regulated by being tested with regard to the technical possibilities and 
strategic means for their gratification” (Habermas 1971: 80). 
The democratic conception of the publics in Dewey, as well as the general 
criticism of the fact-value dichotomy (Putnam 2002), seems to give this model an 
advantage. The claim would thus be that, when it is possible to follow this Pragmatic 
Model, the “interactional” element allows us to reach the best balance by including 
all stakeholders. The adoption of a pragmatist perspective undermines the 
assumptions at the ground of the other models. 
 
5. Pragmatist accounts of collective expertise 
In the previous section, we have seen that one kind of model was deemed more 
“pragmatist” than the others: it is so if we understand “pragmatism” to involve 
substantial theses about the role of the public, along the lines of the third pragmatist 
claim presented in the introduction. If we consider the second claim, about meanings, 
 
23 I cannot comment in detail here, but a very illuminating account is given in (McGoey 2019). 
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and the fourth one, about beliefs as modes of action, another pragmatist contribution 
can be helpful. The argument, this time, would be that all the models are better 
described in pragmatistic terms anyway: if technical terms are to be elucidated 
through reference to “practical bearings”, as Peirce would have it, having a framework 
where expertise models are so depicted would bring us closer to a pragmatist reading 
of what collective expertise does.  
Chateauraynaud and Debaz have developed an interesting matrix for collective 
forms of expertise in several texts, and particularly in their last major book 
(Chateauraynaud and Debaz 2017). It is no accident if we can give a pragmatist 
reading of their typology: for decades, Chateauraynaud has been developing an 
original pragmatist sociology in his lab, the Groupe de Sociologie Pragmatique et 
Réflexive.24  
In his (Chateauraynaud 2009), Chateauraynaud, in addition to mentioning his 
relationship to Peirce's semiotics, Dewey's Theory of Inquiry and Habermas's theory 
of communicative action, provides three cornerstones of his own sociology. It is a 
sociology of “grips”, or “grasps” (“prises” in French): it deals with the “means that 
lay or professional actors develop in their ordinary world in order to keep control on 
current actions, and the problems which arise when they experiment a break or a lack 
of grip.” The idea is that, for a social world to even be possible, people and collectives 
need “common grips”. This first claim is of course a distinctly pragmatic one, and it 
intersects with what Chateauraynaud has developed elsewhere about the “tangible” 
(Bessy and Chateauraynaud 2014). One thinks, of course, of Dewey and his 
distinction between the abstract external “grasp” of the rationalist and the pragmatist, 
interactional version of it: “[t]he essential difference is that between a mind which 
beholds or grasps objects from outside the world of things, physical and social, and 
one which is a participant, interacting with other things and knowing them provided 
the interaction is regulated in a definable way” (Dewey 2008: 160). Chateauraynaud 
provides a very detailed analysis of the ways in which this interaction can emerge or 
fail. The second claim involves possible transformations of society, through “the 
precise description of processes by which an alert or a criticism is taken seriously by 
different actors and enables them to transform collective devices, norms and 
institutions.” The last series of claims, which gave rise to Chateauraynaud's notion of 
argumentative “ballistics”, deal with disputes:  
What kind of disputing procedure is available and how [do] actors deal with the plurality of 
debate arenas or with the different forms of public discussion? How [do] controversies, public 
debates, court trials and political mobilizations affect the course of social transformations? [...] A 
key issue is at stake: in what conditions new arguments could appear, could be transformed in 
common features and could inform the design of standard devices? (Chateauraynaud 2009: 7). 
For our purpose, variants of this third claim are crucial. In Aux bords de 
l'irréversible, Chateauraynaud and Debaz provide such a categorization of expertise 
in the context of “chronic uncertainty” (Chateauraynaud and Debaz 2017: 126). In 
addition to the traditional “monologic” expertise, where experts deliver a report and, 
if requested, an advice or a testimony, four categories describe the new regimes of 
expertise quite well: (1) “Contradictory expertise”, (2) “Collective expertise”, (3) 
“Distributed expertise”, and (4) “Participatory expertise”. These categories do not 
focus on the person or the skills of the individual expert, but allow us to understand 
what expertise is in the context of radical ignorance and controversy; they all have a 
specific pragmatic texture.  
How is that so? First, they point to collective behaviors, ways of doing, contexts 
of action. The first model refers to contradictory expertise, quite frequent in the legal 
 
24 A detailed and authoritative version can be found in (Chateauraynaud 2011), but English-speaking readers 
can find a précis of Chateauraynaud's approach in (Chateauraynaud 2009), where he defines his own 
Transformative Pragmatism. 
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realm, but also in public “arenas” and public debates: NGOs often provide this kind 
of counter-expertise. Social movements, in the context of “undone science”, can unite 
in order to provide such kind of expertise. The second one, “collective expertise”, has 
a different goal: articulating different skills and disciplines in view of a regulation. 
The main motive is not the conflict anymore (or not only) but the plurality of views 
and understandings of a complex phenomenon; it can be led by an agency, often after 
an environmental or sanitary crisis. The IPCC is one example, as well as the French 
Inserm Committee on Asbestos. The third one, as the name suggests, is distributed 
among labs, agencies, NGOs, and the goal is rather to explore different scenarios. The 
fourth one involves interactions between experts (in the classical sense) and citizens. 
The French Consultation citoyenne sur le climat (Citizens' Convention on Climate), 
gathering 150 citizens and experts, is one example. 
This pragmatic emphasis also holds for the expected outcome of the process of 
expertise. Each form of expertise is better described by its expected result rather than 
by more formal features: a verdict or a decision, sometimes a policy, in the first case, 
and thus an overcoming and transformation of the initial conflict; a consensus, the 
formulation of norms and standards, in the second case; a plurality of visions of the 
future or of the object available for policymaking in the third case; trust in the last 
case, and possibly a revision of the distribution of epistemic authority.25 That is why 
Peirce's pragmatist maxim would be of great help here: we use the same word, 
“collective expertise”, to refer to quite distinct practical bearings, whether they 
describe the action undertaken or the practical outcome of the process.  
We do not need to choose between the two approaches described in Sections 4 and 
5. Pragmatism certainly involves substantial claims regarding Democracy and, except 
for specific contexts, the pragmatist model certainly allows for a better distribution of 
rationality overall, but if we think of public controversies, having a pragmatist 
understanding of what expertise models are doing, what kind of transformation they 
achieve, allow or promote, is certainly necessary to empower agents and allow them 
to enjoy a more lucid citizenship. 
6. Expertise on Ignorance? 
A final area in which a pragmatist approach is valuable is, paradoxically perhaps, 
that of ignorance. In this last section, I shall proceed in two steps: first, by trying to 
show that there can be an expertise on ignorance, and not only on reliable knowledge, 
and secondly, by showing why a pragmatist epistemology is one of the best candidates 
to frame this kind of expertise. 
“Ignorance studies”, or even “Agnotology”, to use Robert N. Proctor's term 
(Proctor and Schiebinger 2008), is now an established field of research in STS as well 
as in philosophy. It even has its own Routledge Handbook (Gross and McGoey 2015). 
If the idea of ignorance as an interesting subject-matter is by no means new (Ferrier 
1854), the impetus for the more recent body of works was certainly given by Proctor 
in his Cancer Wars: as the subtitle of his book made clear, he explored “How Politics 
Shapes What We Know and Don't Know about Cancer” (Proctor 1995). Some 
research programs, focusing on the genetic predispositions to cancer (as in the Nixon 
Plan), could lead to overlooking its behavioral and environmental causes. In the 
context of limited time and means, any strong investment in research on one factor of 
a given disease or problem can result in more knowledge being accumulated about 
this factor and, conversely, to relative ignorance about the other factors. The idea was 
that, in addition to epistemology – the study of knowledge – and to sociology – the 
 
25  “This is undoubtedly what should be retained from this fourth model: its capacity to raise questions, 
alternatives or possibilities that the dominant actors, a fuzzy set that includes authoritative scientists, tended to 
dismiss out of hand” (Chateauraynaud and Debaz 2017: 131). 
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study of the social conditions and texture of knowledge –, we needed another line of 
inquiry, studying how and why we do not know what we do not know. In other terms, 
Proctor's agenda was to provide an account of the “cultural production” of ignorance, 
and he argued that ignorance was not only an epistemic state but also, in some 
contexts, an effect, whether its causes were structural, emergent or intentional. I have 
tried to show elsewhere that pragmatist theories of inquiry have allowed us to 
understand these processes: if inquiries are modes of action (actions under severe 
formal and methodological constraints), some of the categories of action can be 
applied to them, i.e. failures, persistent failures and persistent failures caused by the 
actions and strategies of third parties (Girel 2017b). 
Agnotological studies, or “Ignorance studies”, soon became a platform and, in 
Proctor's case, this intuition provided the core of his monumental Golden Holocaust 
about the tobacco industry (Proctor 2011). Grounding his inquiry in the millions of 
pages retrieved from the internal archives of cigarette manufacturers, Proctor showed 
precisely how this industry was able to undermine otherwise reliable knowledge about 
the hazards of tobacco, thus “creating” ignorance in the public about them, putting 
pressure on biomedical research, on expertise, and even hiding some of the most 
worrying details to its own workers. This is only one of the possibilities for “ignorance 
studies”: others have explored strategic ignorance (McGoey 2012), climate change 
denial (Oreskes and Conway 2010), “undone science” (Hess 2016), not to mention 
the understanding of scientific research as “thoroughly conscious ignorance”. Let us 
admit, for the sake of argument, that ignorance can be an academic topic, common to 
epistemology, history and sociology of science. Can there be an expertise about it? 
Recent history provides interesting examples. There are cases in which an expert 
must report on what is not known in a given field. Proctor is also an expert witness 
before the courts, and has been called upon in numerous lawsuits that have pitted 
tobacco companies against patients or families of patients. It is easy to understand 
why: in the lawsuits that opposed them to former consumers, tobacco companies often 
defended themselves by claiming that “everyone” knew that cigarettes were toxic, or 
addictive, but that “no one had any evidence” (Proctor 2006). The assumption was 
that smokers were responsible, since they had started and continued smoking 
knowingly, but not the tobacco companies, since there was supposedly no scientific 
proof of the hazard. Scientific expertise was then mobilized to trace who knew what 
and when, which became decisive in attributing responsibility. In this sense, there is 
therefore an expertise on ignorance, and by extension an expertise on the attribution 
of ignorance. I shall take just one example here, among numerous others. In a 
Canadian trial in 2012,26 Proctor made it clear that knowledge about tobacco hazards 
can mean two different things: “[s]o the theory, as it developed by the historians 
working for the tobacco industry in the United States, was that everyone knew that 
smoking was bad for you – in other words, common knowledge –, but no one could 
prove it – in other words, expert ignorance. And this epistemology, you might say, is 
the most common that's put forward by historians who work for the industry.” 
Although Proctor is in a better position to discuss what knowledge manufacturers 
actually had (and then to determine whether there was really such “expert ignorance”), 
the other side of the coin, “common knowledge” is also pivotal. “Common 
knowledge” can refer to what people were told, were aware of, or to what they 
believed, which is a different thing. In these trials, one bias among the historians 
working for the manufacturers was to exaggerate this “common knowledge” by 
interpreting every public bit of information as common knowledge. This is exactly 
what a historian expert can help clarify. About one expert, Proctor adds: “my criticism 
 
26 All quotes from Proctor’s testimony for Nov 28, 2012. Cécilia Létourneau v. JTI-Macdonald Corp, 
Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. and Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc; Conseil québecois sur le tabac et la santé 
and Jean-Yves Blais v. JTI-Macdonald Corp, Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. and Rothmans, Benson & Hedges 
Inc. Url: https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/xmxh0225. 
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is that he really only looked at what people were told and not enough at what they 
believed.” And then a bit further, about the mere circulation of information, awareness 
and belief: “I mean, awareness is in between, because it's fundamentally a marketing 
concept; it's a measure of exposure, not conviction. And that's why I object to the 
whole notion of awareness, it's vague. Does it mean ‘were you told’ or does it mean 
‘do you believe’?” 
What does this have to do with pragmatism? We can see at once that the expertise 
does not only involve facts, but also doxastic states. Ultimately, the whole debate 
revolves around philosophical questions that were crucial for the doubt-belief 
pragmatist approach to inquiry: did the smokers have hypothetical beliefs, full beliefs, 
dispositions? How can we account for the distinction between the beliefs we profess 
and the beliefs we betray? There are expert reports on what people know, and what 
they do ignore, because knowledge is not only a cloud of information, it is a capacity. 
Knowing in the full sense involves using previous beliefs and information to ask 
questions, to extend one’s knowledge, it involves the capacity to justify one’s beliefs, 
to justify one’s practical judgments, it is exactly what the pragmatists were trying to 
make clearer, and it is exactly what distributes responsibilities in this kind of trial. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have shown that pragmatism, and in particular pragmatist theories 
of inquiry, not only addressed the issue of scientific expertise, but also provided 
interesting tools to account for it, whether in court or in public debates. I have also 
claimed that the strong anti-skepticism of the movement could be a safeguard against 
careless criteria and, further, that a pragmatist account of meaning could cast light on 
the contexts in which these criteria are functioning. Telling which difference makes a 
difference, trying to “Make it explicit”, to borrow Brandom’s phrase, is one of the 
most enduring endeavors of the pragmatist movement, and it is particularly needed 
here, as the debate has often focused on definitions, or on general forms of expertise, 
without exploring their practical background. 
Scholarship, in recent years, has actively contributed to extending the pragmatist 
canon: Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead have been joined by many others, DuBois, 
Locke, Mary Follett and Jane Addams for the “classical period”, and a wide variety 
of contemporary research from, say, Shusterman to Brandom, Price or Kitcher. There 
are groundbreaking pragmatist contributions in all walks of academia, from aesthetics 
to ethics and neurosciences. Having more pragmatist contributions on scientific 
expertise and others forms of applied knowledge would be a very useful addition. 
Public debates around scientific expertise raise philosophical, epistemological and 
practical questions, and if pragmatism were to remain silent on these questions, it 
would be a severe limitation of its resources.  
Regarding scientific expertise, if what has been proposed is sound, it cannot be 
approached through the resources of one discipline only. Interdisciplinarity is often a 
very vague word used in answers to calls for projects, but in this case, it is strictly 
required. Without a dialogue with jurists, who are able to tell what a change in 
constitutional or legal texts will lead to, scientists from the field, who can tell what 
the most pressing questions are for them, and sociologists, who can provide the 
conceptualization and description of the social texture of expertise, a philosophical 
account of expertise will be incomplete and deficient. 
Finally, regarding agnotology, we have seen that it made sense to make room for 
expertise about ignorance. Such expertise is not confined to the courtroom: there is 
robust research on “absences” in knowledge, on projects that were abandoned because 
they were at odds with social norms, on “undone science”, science that could be 
developed with the resources we have but which is not developed until social 
movements ask for it. These are all cases of unintentional production of ignorance. 
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The kind of abstract characterizations of science and scientific expertise we have 
studied above can contribute to unnecessary controversies and to a public distrust of 
science. Deciding whether they deserve their own chapter in agnotological studies is 
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